HOAH! I've briefed guys all the way up to the reprobate that was in NCA at the time (on Kashmir, of all thngs), and as Yancy pointed out, we do not make intel reports based off one bit of data. No one in authority is going to stick their neck out on a guess; they're too fond of their careers.
The sat images, the intercepts -- they're all great, but they only give you 'warnings and indicators'. The solid intel is done by some brave but scared guy, in country, who could be burned at a moment's notice if a particular bit of intelligence is released. Our 'flawed' intelligence in Bosnia and other missions through the '80s/90s were due to massive cutbacks in HUMINT (the guys on the ground) and thepolicymakers screwing up by not listening to what we tell them. It's been improving over the past couple of years as we've turned our focus back toward HUMINT to augment SIGINT and PHOTINT.
In Iraq, it's always been the case that our best data coes from some brave but terrified guy (usually a native) hanging it all out to get us the truth. We slip up with who gets the raw data, this guy dies.
"War is an ugly thing but not the ugliest of things; the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feelings which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse. A man who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing which is more important than his own personal safety, is a miserable creature and has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself."
John Stuart Mill